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TAXATION-ORDINARY AND NECESSARY EXPENSES-DEDUCTION OF .ADVER-
TISING EXPENSES INCURRED To DEFEAT STATE INITIATIVE MEASURES-Petitioners 
were members of a partnership engaged in the wholesale distribution of 
beer in Washington. In 1948 the partnership made contributions to a 
publicity campaign instituted to defeat an initiative to be presented to the 
voting public, the passage of which would have placed retail beer and 
wine sales exclusively in state hands. In their 1948 tax returns peti-
tioners deducted the amount contributed as ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense. After the Commissioner disallowed the deduction the peti-
tioners paid the deficiency under protest and sued for a refund in the 
district court. That court denied the refund, ruling that the payments 
were expended for the defeat of legislation within the meaning of an exist-
ing treasury regulation1 which prohibited deduction of such expenditures 
1 Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23 (0)-1. 
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as ordinary and necessary business expense under section 23 (a) (1) (A) of 
the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. The court of appeals affirmed.2 On 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The per-
tinent regulation is designed to implement the sound public policy of 
keeping the Treasury out of political controversies and has acquired the force 
of law due to (1) reenactment without change of the code provision which 
the regulation interprets and (2) consistent rulings by the courts disallowing 
such deductions in accordance with the regulation. Cammarano v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).3 
In determination of taxable income, all ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses are deductible from gross income.4 The expense involved in 
the instant case would seem to qualify as both ordinary5 and necessary,0 
since any businessman would reasonably be expected to oppose legislation 
which threatens to put him out of business. Nevertheless, the deduction was 
denied on the basis of the interpretation of allowable ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses found in the treasury regulations. The court in the 
principal case based its decision primarily on the so-called "reenactment" 
doctrine.7 Courts have often stated that reenactment without change of a 
2 (9th Cir. 1951) 246 F. (2d) 751. 
a The court also decided the companion case of Strauss v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), involving an almost identical fact situation, the only differ-
ences being that in Strauss prohibition was being directly voted in at the state-wide election 
and the petitioner was a corporation, thereby making Treas. Reg. 103, §19.23 (q)-1, Treas. 
Reg. 111, §29.23 (q)-1 and Treas. Reg. ll8, §39.23 (q)-1 the appropriate regulations under 
the 1939 code. These regulations disallowed deductions by corporations for expenses in-
curred in the promotion or defeat of legislation. 
4 I.R.C., §162 (a), The principal was case decided under I.R.C. (1939), §23 (a) (I) (A) 
which provided for the same deduction. 
5 "Ordinary" has been interpreted to mean an expense that normally would be in-
curred by a taxpayer in a similar business if faced with the situation. See Welch v. Helver-
ing, 290 U.S. Ill (1933). See also Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928), holding 
that attorney's fees incurred in defending claim of one partner against the other arising 
out of partnership of money owed was an ordinary expense of doing business. Certainly 
such an expense is generally not thought of as recurring, nor was there evidence that such 
an expense had previously been incurred. An ordinary expense may arise only once in 
the taxpayer's lifetime. See Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940). 
6 The word "necessary" has been interpreted to mean appropriate or helpful. See 
Alverson v. Commissioner, 35 B.T .A. 482 (1937). See also Miller v. Commissioner, 37 
B.T .A. 830 (1938) which held that an insurance agent expending his own money to obtain 
policies with a new company for his clients after his company failed was necessary to 
protect his business though he was under no legal or moral obligation to incur such 
expenses. 
7 The Court also relied upon Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 
U.S. 326 (1941), which upheld the validity of the identical regulation. However, Textile 
Mills is distinguishable from the principal case on three distinct grounds: in Textile there 
was (1) a direct appeal to Congress; (2) no danger of substantial or complete impairment 
of the taxpayer's business; (3) a contingent expense, the amount of which depended solely 
upon how much property was. successfully recovered, which was deemed opprobrious by 
the court. Since the expenses involved in the principal case were incurred to influence the 
voting public rather than a group of legislators and there is no indication that such activity 
was undesirable in terms of any apparent policy considerations, the upholding of the 
regulation in Textile Mills should not necessarily control. See Holzman, "Tax Classics," 30 
TAXES 149 (1952) for a discussion of the Textile Mills case and the effects of the decision. 
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code provision where regulations exist under which cases have been pre-
viously decided is tantamount to congressional approval of such regula-
tions.8 This rule has been subjected to criticism. Some courts have stated 
that reenactment is an unreliable indicium of congressional intent,9 and 
that the regulation will not be followed if it is unreasonable10 or incon-
sistent with the law under which the regulation was promulgated.11 At 
most the regulations should be used as an indication to the taxpayer of the 
stand the Commissioner intends to take. Under such a view a court would 
indulge in no presumptions of congressional approval of the regulations 
without actual manifestations of such approval, but rather would deter-
mine the controversy before it by reference to its own view of the law. If 
this were done courts would have to deal with the issues presented by ref-
erence to their own views of the law, without resorting to the unrealistic 
reenactment doctrine to substantiate their decisions. Yet the almost over-
whelming weight of authority involving similar fact situations has followed 
the decision in the principal case, stating that the regulation is controlling 
because of the reenactment doctrine.12 
It is questionable whether the decision in the instant case is sound in 
terms of the policy considerations which are often inherent in disallowing 
s See Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, note 7 supra; Helvering v. Win-
mill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. IOI (1930). 
9 See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). See also I MERTENS,_ 
I.Aw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §3.24 (1954; 1959 Supp.) stating that it is absurd to 
indulge in the fiction that the full import of Treasury regulations is known to the mem-
bers of Congress. It is similarly improbable that the legislators have actual knowledge of 
relevant cases applying the regulation. 
10 See Commissioner v. Clark, (7th Cir. 1953) 202 F. (2d) 94. 
11Lynch v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U.S. 315 (1924). 
12 Herbert Davis, 26 T.C. 49 (1956); Revere Racing Assn. v. Scanlon, (1st Cir. 1956) 
232 F. (2d) 816; McClintock-Trunkey Co., 19 T.C. 297 (1952), revd. on other grounds (9th 
Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 329; Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 
1934) 69 F. (2d) 676. All of the above cases involved expenditures to influence the general 
voting public to vote a certain way on referendums, initiatives, etc. For cases involving 
influence of legislatures rather· than the voting public, see Mary E. Bellingrath, 46 13.T.A. 
89 (1942); American Hardware & Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1943) 202 F. 
(2d) 126; Roberts Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 948, cert. den. 
344 U.S. 865 (1952); The Mosby Hotel Co., P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. ,i54,288 (1954). It has 
been held that expenses incurred to influence legislation are not ordinary. H. R. Cullen, 
41 13.T.A. 1054 (1940), revd. on other grounds (5th Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 651; The Adler 
Co., 10 13.T .A. 849 (1928). However, the view that such expenses are not ordinary is not 
generally followed. See G. T. Wofford, 15 13.T .A. 1225 (1929); Appeal of Independent 
Brewing Co. of Pittsburgh, 413.T.A. 870 (1926), which held expenses incurred in influencing 
legislation were deductible as' ordinary and necessary business expense. See also Luther 
Ely Smith, 3 T.C. 696 (1944), which allowed as an ordinary and necessary business 
expense deduction a contribution to an organization which contemplated an amendment 
to the state constitution through an initiative voted upon by the people. The Com-
missioner acquiesced in this decision until 1958 when he withdrew his acquiescence and 
stated that expenditures to promote or defeat a constitutional amendment are not deduct-
ible under I.R.C., §162 (a). 1958 Cum. 13ul. No. 255, p. 91, Jan.-June. See generally Spiegel, 
"Deductibility of Lobbying Initiative and Referendum Expenses: A Problem for Congres-
sional Consideration,'' 45 CALIF. L. ~. I (1957), for an exhaustive discussion of the 
problem. 
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deduction of certain expenses. Deductions are often said to be a matter 
of legislative grace,18 and expenses which are ordinary and necessary have 
been disallowed when they are contrary to a clearly defined public policy.14 
Although the general question of what expenses violate public policy has 
engendered much confusion, the policy violations usually concern expenses 
incurred in carrying on some illegal activity.i:, However, disallowance of the 
deduction in the principal case cannot be based on an illegal activity. 
While perhaps at one time pressure on Congress was looked upon with 
sufficient disfavor by the courts to warrant such disallowance because of the 
undesirability of the activity,16 the fact that Congress has chosen to regulate 
rather than prohibit lobbying in its own quarters17 indicates only certain 
aspects of it can now be regarded as undesirable.18 Nevertheless, the regu-
lations disallow deductions for lobbying expense.19 But even if it should be 
conceded that influencing the legislature is so undesirable that the expenses 
incurred thereby should be disallowed as a deduction, it does not necessarily 
follow that the expense incurred in the principal case should be disallowed. 
13 See Deputy v. DuPont, note 5 supra; White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281 (1938); 
City Ice Delivery Co. v. United States, (4th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 347. Despite such state-
ments by the courts, it is questionable whether deductions are a matter of legislative grace 
with regard to the income tax. Failure to allow such deductions might be a tax on prop-
erty rather than on income which is beyond the scope of the Sixteenth Amendment, thereby 
requiring apportionment to be constitutional. 
14 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Black v. United 
States, (Ct. CI. 1955) 129 F. Supp. 956; Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 
(5th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 276. 
15 For example, the illegal expenses of a legal business have been held to be non-
deductible. An example of such expense is a fine for violation of a state statute which has 
been said would violate state policy if a deduction were allowed. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, note 14 supra; Hoover Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38 (1958); 
Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, (8th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 373. See also 59 
YALE L.J. 561 (1950). Yet the illegal expenses of an illegal business have been allowed as 
deductions. Examples of such expenses are wages and rent expenditures incurred in 
gambling which is illegal under state law. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958); 
Cohen v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 394. However, in the Cohen case, 
amounts paid for protection without which a gambling establishment could not be run 
were held not to be a legitimate business expense and thus not deductible. See generally 
Schwartz, "Business Expense Contrary to Public Policy: An Evaluation of The Lilly Case," 
8 TAX L. R.Ev. 241 (1953), and note, 51 CoL. L. R.Ev. 752 (1951). 
16 See Hazelton v. Scheckells, 202 U.S. 71 (1906); Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 
441 (1874). 
17 This regulation is contained in the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 
839-842 (1946), 2 U.S.C. (1952) §§261-270. The act was held valid, insofar as applicable 
to representations made directly to members of Congress, in United States v. Harris, 347 
U.S. 612 (1954). See comment, 56 YALE L.J. 304 (1947). 
18 See 98 CONG. R.Ec. 2881 (1952), where Senator Humphrey said, " ••• There is noth-
ing wrong in being a legitimate lobbyist-in fact it may be very desirable .... " Not only is 
some lobbying desirable, it may also be an exercise of the First Amendment rights of 
speech and petition. See National Association of Manufacturers v. McGrath, (D.C. D.C. 
1952) 103 F. Supp. 510, vacated as moot 344 U.S. 804; United States v. Rumely, (D.C. Cir. 
1952) 197 F. (2d) 166, affd. 345 U.S. 41 (1953); United States v. Harriss, note 17 supra. 
See also the opinion of Justice Douglas, concurring in the principal case, at 513. 
19 Proposed Treas. Reg. 162-15 (c) (1956). 
146 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 58 
Arguably, the only type of undesirable influence on legislation consists of 
highly concentrated pressure exerted on a small group of legislators, which 
might unduly influence their judgment.20 But in the instant case the 
pressure was no more than a broad publicity campaign, less direct in its 
application, aimed at persuading the voting public to vote against the 
measure. Despite this difference, the Court in the instant case indicates 
that allowance of the deduction for such expense would violate public 
policy because of a tax advantage which would inure to petitioners. The 
Court states that as purchased publicity can influence the outcome of leg-
islation affecting the entire community, campaigners on both sides should 
stand on equal footing as far as tax deductions are concerned.21 In so 
holding, the Court appears to be extending the use of public policy as a 
basis for disallowance of certain expense deductions. In the past disallow-
ance on policy grounds generally has been predicated on either the illegality 
or the undesirability of the activity giving rise to the expense. By this 
decision, the doctrine has been extended to embrace disallowances where 
tax advantages might inure to a party which could fue contrary to the 
public interest, despite the fact that the activity resulting in the expense 
was above reproach. The Court's opinion ignores the petitioner's policy 
argument that all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in legitimate 
business activity should be deductible if the aggrieved taxpayer is to be 
treated equally with other taxpayers. The better approach would seem to 
be to wait until Congress expressly manifests its intent to disallow a seem-
ingly deductible expense rather than speculating on their probable intent. 
In this way, decisions could be based on reasonable interpretations of 
relatively precise law without regard to vague notions of public policy.22 
Robert J. Paley, S.Ed. 
20 See United States v. Harriss, note 17 supra, at 625, for a discussion of the undesir-
able aspects of direct lobbying. See also United States v. Rumely, note 18 supra, where 
at 197 F. (2d) 174 and 177, the court sharply distinguishes direct lobbying at the "button-
hole" and lobbying through the medium of public opinion with regard to the undesirable 
elements involved .. 
21 See principal case at 513. 
22 See Paul, "The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deduc-
tions," UNIV. oF So. CAL. TAX INSTITUTE 715 (1954), criticizing the concept of public policy 
as a basis for disallowing certain expenses. See also Spiegel, "Deductibility of Lobbying, 
Initiative and Referendum Expenses: A Problem for Congressional Consideration," 45 
CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1957), proposing congressional clarification of the problem of whether 
expenses incurred to influence legislation can be deducted as ordinary and necessary 
business expense. 
